Serve uploaded SVGs under their CSP, and identify the image fetcher

The Content-Security-Policy meant for stored SVGs never applied: in
Caddy a `*` in the middle of a path does not cross a `/`, so
`path /storage/*.svg` only matched files directly under /storage, and
every upload lives in a directory below it. Two matchers, which Caddy
ANDs, cover any depth.

RemoteImage fetched with Guzzle's anonymous default User-Agent, which
Wikimedia answers with 403. It now sends `<app>/1.0 (+<app url>; media
fetcher)`, the identification such hosts ask of automated clients.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-28 20:43:59 +02:00
parent ac546eba2b
commit 7e672a5e62
3 changed files with 48 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,15 @@
# second line: opened directly rather than through an <img>, an SVG is a
# document, and nothing stored here has any business running script or
# loading anything from elsewhere.
@svg path /storage/*.svg
#
# Two matchers, which Caddy ANDs, rather than `path /storage/*.svg`: a `*`
# in the middle of a path does not cross a `/`, so that pattern only ever
# matched files directly under /storage — and every upload is a directory
# below it.
@svg {
path /storage/*
path_regexp (?i)\.svg$
}
header @svg Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src data:"
# The frontend is a separate application on another origin.